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An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations - Chapter 2

1. Introduction And Plan Of The Work

2. Book 1, Chapter 1

3. Chapter 2

4. Chapter 3

5. Chapter 4

6. Chapter 5

7. Chapter 6

8. Chapter 7

9. Chapter 8

10. Chapter 8 continue

11. Chapter 9

12. Chapter 10

13. Chapter 10 continue

14. Chapter 11

15. Chapter 11 continue

16. Chapter 11 continue.

17. Chapter 11 continue..

18. Chapter 11 continue...

19. Conclusion of the Chapter 11

20. Book 2 Introduction

21. Chapter 1

22. Chapter II

23. Chapter II continue

24. Chapter II continue

25. Chapter 3

26. Chapter 4

27. Chapter 5

28. Book 3, Chapter 1

29. Chapter 2

30. Chapter 3

31. Chapter 4

32. Book 4, Chapter 1

33. Chapter 1 continue

34. Chapter 2

35. Chapter 3, Part 1

36. Chapter 3, Part 2

37. Chapter 4

38. Chapter 5

39. Chapter 5 continue

40. Chapter 6

41. Chapter 7, Part 1

42. Chapter 7, Part 2

43. Chapter 7, Part 3

44. Chapter 7, Part 3 continue

45. Chapter 8

46. Chapter 9

47. Book 5, Chapter 1, Part 1

48. Chapter 1, Part 2

49. Chapter 1, Part 3

50. Chapter 1, Part 3 continue

51. Chapter 1, Part 3 continue B

52. Chapter 1, Part 4

53. Chapter 2, Part 1

54. Chapter 2, Part 2

55. Chapter 2, Part 2 continue

56. Chapter 2, Part 2 continue B

57. Chapter 2, Part 2 continue C

58. Chapter 2, Part 2 continue D

59. Chapter 3

60. Chapter 3 continue







Chapter II. Of The Discouragement Of Agriculture In The Ancient State Of Europe, After The Fall Of The Roman Empire.

When the German and Scythian nations overran the western provinces of
the Roman empire, the confusions which followed so great a revolution
lasted for several centuries. The rapine and violence which the
barbarians exercised against the ancient inhabitants, interrupted the
commerce between the towns and the country. The towns were deserted, and
the country was left uncultivated; and the western provinces of Europe,
which had enjoyed a considerable degree of opulence under the Roman
empire, sunk into the lowest state of poverty and barbarism. During the
continuance of those confusions, the chiefs and principal leaders of
those nations acquired, or usurped to themselves, the greater part of
the lands of those countries. A great part of them was uncultivated; but
no part of them, whether cultivated or uncultivated, was left without
a proprietor. All of them were engrossed, and the greater part by a few
great proprietors.

This original engrossing of uncultivated lands, though a great, might
have been but a transitory evil. They might soon have been divided
again, and broke into small parcels, either by succession or by
alienation. The law of primogeniture hindered them from being divided by
succession; the introduction of entails prevented their being broke into
small parcels by alienation.

When land, like moveables, is considered as the means only of
subsistence and enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it,
like them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the
subsistence and enjoyment may be supposed equally dear to the father.
This natural law of succession, accordingly, took place among the Romans
who made no more distinction between elder and younger, between male and
female, in the inheritance of lands, than we do in the distribution of
moveables. But when land was considered as the means, not of subsistence
merely, but of power and protection, it was thought better that it
should descend undivided to one. In those disorderly times, every great
landlord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects.
He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace
and their leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion,
frequently against his neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign.
The security of a landed estate, therefore, the protection which
its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its
greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it
to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbours.
The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately
indeed, but in process of time, in the succession of landed estates, for
the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies,
though not always at their first institution. That the power, and
consequently the security of the monarchy, may not be weakened by
division, it must descend entire to one of the children. To which of
them so important a preference shall be given, must be determined
by some general rule, founded not upon the doubtful distinctions of
personal merit, but upon some plain and evident difference which can
admit of no dispute. Among the children of the same family there can be
no indisputable difference but that of sex, and that of age. The male
sex is universally preferred to the female; and when all other things
are equal, the elder everywhere takes place of the younger. Hence the
origin of the right of primogeniture, and of what is called lineal
succession.

Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances
which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them
reasonable, are no more. In the present state of Europe, the proprietor
of a single acre of land is as perfectly secure in his possession as
the proprietor of 100,000. The right of primogeniture, however, still
continues to be respected; and as of all institutions it is the fittest
to support the pride of family distinctions, it is still likely to
endure for many centuries. In every other respect, nothing can be more
contrary to the real interest of a numerous family, than a right which,
in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children.

Entails are the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture. They
were introduced to preserve a certain lineal succession, of which the
law of primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the
original estate from being carried out of the proposed line, either
by gift, or device, or alienation; either by the folly, or by the
misfortune of any of its successive owners. They were altogether unknown
to the Romans. Neither their substitutions, nor fidei commisses, bear
any resemblance to entails, though some French lawyers have thought
proper to dress the modern institution in the language and garb of those
ancient ones.

When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might
not be unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some
monarchies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from
being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the
present state of Europe, when small as well as great estates derive
their security from the laws of their country, nothing can be more
completely absurd. They are founded upon the most absurd of all
suppositions, the supposition that every successive generation of men
have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it possesses; but
that the property of the present generation should be restrained and
regulated according to the fancy of those who died, perhaps five hundred
years ago. Entails, however, are still respected, through the greater
part of Europe; In those countries, particularly, in which noble birth
is a necessary qualification for the enjoyment either of civil or
military honours. Entails are thought necessary for maintaining this
exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honours of
their country; and that order having usurped one unjust advantage over
the rest of their fellow-citizens, lest their poverty should render it
ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should have another. The
common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities, and
they are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European
monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them. In
Scotland, more than one fifth, perhaps more than one third part of the
whole lands in the country, are at present supposed to be under strict
entail.

Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner not only engrossed
by particular families, but the possibility of their being divided again
was as much as possible precluded for ever. It seldom happens, however,
that a great proprietor is a great improver. In the disorderly times
which gave birth to those barbarous institutions, the great proprietor
was sufficiently employed in defending his own territories, or in
extending his jurisdiction and authority over those of his neighbours.
He had no leisure to attend to the cultivation and improvement of land.
When the establishment of law and order afforded him this leisure, he
often wanted the inclination, and almost always the requisite abilities.
If the expense of his house and person either equalled or exceeded his
revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no stock to employ in this
manner. If he was an economist, he generally found it more profitable
to employ his annual savings in new purchases than in the improvement of
his old estate. To improve land with profit, like all other commercial
projects, requires an exact attention to small savings and small gains,
of which a man born to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal, is
very seldom capable. The situation of such a person naturally disposes
him to attend rather to ornament, which pleases his fancy, than to
profit, for which he has so little occasion. The elegance of his dress,
of his equipage, of his house and household furniture, are objects
which, from his infancy, he has been accustomed to have some anxiety
about. The turn of mind which this habit naturally forms, follows him
when he comes to think of the improvement of land. He embellishes,
perhaps, four or five hundred acres in the neighbourhood of his
house, at ten times the expense which the land is worth after all his
improvements; and finds, that if he was to improve his whole estate in
the same manner, and he has little taste for any other, he would be
a bankrupt before he had finished the tenth part of it. There still
remain, in both parts of the united kingdom, some great estates which
have continued, without interruption, in the hands of the same family
since the times of feudal anarchy. Compare the present condition of
those estates with the possessions of the small proprietors in their
neighbourhood, and you will require no other argument to convince you
how unfavourable such extensive property is to improvement.

If little improvement was to be expected from such great proprietors,
still less was to be hoped for from those who occupied the land under
them. In the ancient state of Europe, the occupiers of land were all
tenants at will. They were all, or almost all, slaves, but their slavery
was of a milder kind than that known among the ancient Greeks and
Romans, or even in our West Indian colonies. They were supposed to
belong more directly to the land than to their master. They could,
therefore, be sold with it, but not separately. They could marry,
provided it was with the consent of their master; and he could not
afterwards dissolve the marriage by selling the man and wife to
different persons. If he maimed or murdered any of them, he was liable
to some penalty, though generally but to a small one. They were not,
however, capable of acquiring property. Whatever they acquired was
acquired to their master, and he could take it from them at pleasure.
Whatever cultivation and improvement could be carried on by means of
such slaves, was properly carried on by their master. It was at his
expense. The seed, the cattle, and the instruments of husbandry, were
all his. It was for his benefit. Such slaves could acquire nothing
but their daily maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himself,
therefore, that in this case occupied his own lands, and cultivated them
by his own bondmen. This species of slavery still subsists in Russia,
Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, and other parts of Germany. It is
only in the western and south-western provinces of Europe that it has
gradually been abolished altogether.

But if great improvements are seldom to be expected from great
proprietors, they are least of all to be expected when they employ
slaves for their workmen. The experience of all ages and nations, I
believe, demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to
cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person
who can acquire no property can have no other interest but to eat as
much and to labour as little as possible. Whatever work he does beyond
what is sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out
of him by violence only, and not by any interest of his own. In ancient
Italy, how much the cultivation of corn degenerated, how unprofitable
it became to the master, when it fell under the management of slaves, is
remarked both by Pliny and Columella. In the time of Aristotle, it had
not been much better in ancient Greece. Speaking of the ideal republic
described in the laws of Plato, to maintain 5000 idle men (the number of
warriors supposed necessary for its defence), together with their women
and servants, would require, he says, a territory of boundless extent
and fertility, like the plains of Babylon.

The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies
him so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors.
Wherever the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it,
therefore, he will generally prefer the service of slaves to that of
freemen. The planting of sugar and tobacco can afford the expense of
slave cultivation. The raising of corn, it seems, in the present times,
cannot. In the English colonies, of which the principal produce is corn,
the far greater part of the work is done by freemen. The late resolution
of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, to set at liberty all their negro
slaves, may satisfy us that their number cannot be very great. Had they
made any considerable part of their property, such a resolution could
never have been agreed to. In our sugar colonies., on the contrary, the
whole work is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies a very great
part of it. The profits of a sugar plantation in any of our West Indian
colonies, are generally much greater than those of any other cultivation
that is known either in Europe or America; and the profits of a tobacco
plantation, though inferior to those of sugar, are superior to those of
corn, as has already been observed. Both can afford the expense of
slave cultivation but sugar can afford it still better than tobacco. The
number of negroes, accordingly, is much greater, in proportion to that
of whites, in our sugar than in our tobacco colonies.

To the slave cultivators of ancient times gradually succeeded a species
of farmers, known at present in France by the name of metayers. They are
called in Latin Coloni Partiarii. They have been so long in disuse in
England, that at present I know no English name for them. The proprietor
furnished them with the seed, cattle, and instruments of husbandry, the
whole stock, in short, necessary for cultivating the farm. The produce
was divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, after setting
aside what was judged necessary for keeping up the stock, which was
restored to the proprietor, when the farmer either quitted or was turned
out of the farm.

Land occupied by such tenants is properly cultivated at the expense of
the proprietors, as much as that occupied by slaves. There is, however,
one very essential difference between them. Such tenants, being freemen,
are capable of acquiring property; and having a certain proportion
of the produce of the land, they have a plain interest that the
whole produce should be as great as possible, in order that their own
proportion may be so. A slave, on the contrary, who can acquire nothing
but his maintenance, consults his own ease, by making the land produce
as little as possible over and above that maintenance. It is probable
that it was partly upon account of this advantage, and partly upon
account of the encroachments which the sovereigns, always jealous of
the great lords, gradually encouraged their villains to make upon their
authority, and which seem, at least, to have been such as rendered this
species of servitude altogether inconvenient, that tenure in villanage
gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe. The time and
manner, however, in which so important a revolution was brought about,
is one of the most obscure points in modern history. The church of
Rome claims great merit in it; and it is certain, that so early as
the twelfth century, Alexander III. published a bull for the general
emancipation of slaves. It seems, however, to have been rather a pious
exhortation, than a law to which exact obedience was required from the
faithful. Slavery continued to take place almost universally for several
centuries afterwards, till it was gradually abolished by the joint
operation of the two interests above mentioned; that of the proprietor
on the one hand, and that of the sovereign on the other. A villain,
enfranchised, and at the same time allowed to continue in possession of
the land, having no stock of his own, could cultivate it only by means
of what the landlord advanced to him, and must therefore have been what
the French call a metayer.

It could never, however, be the interest even of this last species of
cultivators, to lay out, in the further improvement of the land, any
part of the little stock which they might save from their own share of
the produce; because the landlord, who laid out nothing, was to get one
half of whatever it produced. The tithe, which is but a tenth of the
produce, is found to be a very great hindrance to improvement. A tax,
therefore, which amounted to one half, must have been an effectual bar
to it. It might be the interest of a metayer to make the land produce
as much as could be brought out of it by means of the stock furnished
by the proprietor; but it could never be his interest to mix any part
of his own with it. In France, where five parts out of six of the whole
kingdom are said to be still occupied by this species of cultivators,
the proprietors complain, that their metayers take every opportunity of
employing their master's cattle rather in carriage than in cultivation;
because, in the one case, they get the whole profits to themselves, in
the other they share them with their landlord. This species of tenants
still subsists in some parts of Scotland. They are called steel-bow
tenants. Those ancient English tenants, who are said by Chief-Baron
Gilbert and Dr Blackstone to have been rather bailiffs of the landlord
than farmers, properly so called, were probably of the same kind.

To this species of tenantry succeeded, though by very slow degrees,
farmers, properly so called, who cultivated the land with their own
stock, paying a rent certain to the landlord. When such farmers have a
lease for a term of years, they may sometimes find it for their interest
to lay out part of their capital in the further improvement of the farm;
because they may sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit,
before the expiration of the lease. The possession, even of such
farmers, however, was long extremely precarious, and still is so in many
parts of Europe. They could, before the expiration of their term, be
legally ousted of their leases by a new purchaser; in England, even,
by the fictitious action of a common recovery. If they were turned out
illegally by the violence of their master, the action by which they
obtained redress was extremely imperfect. It did not always reinstate
them in the possession of the land, but gave them damages, which never
amounted to a real loss. Even in England, the country, perhaps of
Europe, where the yeomanry has always been most respected, it was not
till about the 14th of Henry VII. that the action of ejectment
was invented, by which the tenant recovers, not damages only, but
possession, and in which his claim is not necessarily concluded by the
uncertain decision of a single assize. This action has been found so
effectual a remedy, that, in the modern practice, when the landlord has
occasion to sue for the possession of the land, he seldom makes use
of the actions which properly belong to him as a landlord, the writ of
right or the writ of entry, but sues in the name of his tenant, by the
writ of ejectment. In England, therefore the security of the tenant is
equal to that of the proprietor. In England, besides, a lease for life
of forty shillings a-year value is a freehold, and entitles the lessee
to a vote for a member of parliament; and as a great part of the
yeomanry have freeholds of this kind, the whole order becomes
respectable to their landlords, on account of the political
consideration which this gives them. There is, I believe, nowhere in
Europe, except in England, any instance of the tenant building upon
the land of which he had no lease, and trusting that the honour of his
landlord would take no advantage of so important an improvement.
Those laws and customs, so favourable to the yeomanry, have perhaps
contributed more to the present grandeur of England, than all their
boasted regulations of commerce taken together.

The law which secures the longest leases against successors of every
kind, is, so far as I know, peculiar to Great Britain. It was introduced
into Scotland so early as 1449, by a law of James II. Its beneficial
influence, however, has been much obstructed by entails; the heirs of
entail being generally restrained from letting leases for any long term
of years, frequently for more than one year. A late act of parliament
has, in this respect, somewhat slackened their fetters, though they are
still by much too strait. In Scotland, besides, as no leasehold gives a
vote for a member of parliament, the yeomanry are upon this account less
respectable to their landlords than in England.

In other parts of Europe, after it was found convenient to secure
tenants both against heirs and purchasers, the term of their security
was still limited to a very short period; in France, for example, to
nine years from the commencement of the lease. It has in that country,
indeed, been lately extended to twentyseven, a period still too short
to encourage the tenant to make the most important improvements. The
proprietors of land were anciently the legislators of every part of
Europe. The laws relating to land, therefore, were all calculated
for what they supposed the interest of the proprietor. It was for
his interest, they had imagined, that no lease granted by any of his
predecessors should hinder him from enjoying, during a long term of
years, the full value of his land. Avarice and injustice are always
short-sighted, and they did not foresee how much this regulation must
obstruct improvement, and thereby hurt, in the long-run, the real
interest of the landlord.

The farmers, too, besides paying the rent, were anciently, it was
supposed, bound to perform a great number of services to the landlord,
which were seldom either specified in the lease, or regulated by any
precise rule, but by the use and wont of the manor or barony. These
services, therefore, being almost entirely arbitrary, subjected the
tenant to many vexations. In Scotland the abolition of all services not
precisely stipulated in the lease, has, in the course of a few years,
very much altered for the better the condition of the yeomanry of that
country.

The public services to which the yeomanry were bound, were not less
arbitrary than the private ones. To make and maintain the high roads,
a servitude which still subsists, I believe, everywhere, though with
different degrees of oppression in different countries, was not the only
one. When the king's troops, when his household, or his officers of any
kind, passed through any part of the country, the yeomanry were bound
to provide them with horses, carriages, and provisions, at a price
regulated by the purveyor. Great Britain is, I believe, the only
monarchy in Europe where the oppression of purveyance has been entirely
abolished. It still subsists in France and Germany.

The public taxes, to which they were subject, were as irregular and
oppressive as the services The ancient lords, though extremely unwilling
to grant, themselves, any pecuniary aid to their sovereign, easily
allowed him to tallage, as they called it, their tenants, and had not
knowledge enough to foresee how much this must, in the end, affect their
own revenue. The taille, as it still subsists in France may serve as an
example of those ancient tallages. It is a tax upon the supposed profits
of the farmer, which they estimate by the stock that he has upon the
farm. It is his interest, therefore, to appear to have as little as
possible, and consequently to employ as little as possible in its
cultivation, and none in its improvement. Should any stock happen to
accumulate in the hands of a French farmer, the taille is almost equal
to a prohibition of its ever being employed upon the land. This tax,
besides, is supposed to dishonour whoever is subject to it, and to
degrade him below, not only the rank of a gentleman, but that of a
burgher; and whoever rents the lands of another becomes subject to it.
No gentleman, nor even any burgher, who has stock, will submit to this
degradation. This tax, therefore, not only hinders the stock which
accumulates upon the land from being employed in its improvement, but
drives away all other stock from it. The ancient tenths and fifteenths,
so usual in England in former times, seem, so far as they affected the
land, to have been taxes of the same nature with the taille.

Under all these discouragements, little improvement could be expected
from the occupiers of land. That order of people, with all the liberty
and security which law can give, must always improve under great
disadvantage. The farmer, compared with the proprietor, is as a merchant
who trades with burrowed money, compared with one who trades with his
own. The stock of both may improve; but that of the one, with only equal
good conduct, must always improve more slowly than that of the other,
on account of the large share of the profits which is consumed by the
interest of the loan. The lands cultivated by the farmer must, in the
same manner, with only equal good conduct, be improved more slowly than
those cultivated by the proprietor, on account of the large share of the
produce which is consumed in the rent, and which, had the farmer been
proprietor, he might have employed in the further improvement of the
land. The station of a farmer, besides, is, from the nature of things,
inferior to that of a proprietor. Through the greater part of Europe,
the yeomanry are regarded as an inferior rank of people, even to the
better sort of tradesmen and mechanics, and in all parts of Europe to
the great merchants and master manufacturers. It can seldom happen,
therefore, that a man of any considerable stock should quit the
superior, in order to place himself in an inferior station. Even in the
present state of Europe, therefore, little stock is likely to go from
any other profession to the improvement of land in the way of farming.
More does, perhaps, in Great Britain than in any other country, though
even there the great stocks which are in some places employed in
farming, have generally been acquired by fanning, the trade, perhaps,
in which, of all others, stock is commonly acquired most slowly. After
small proprietors, however, rich and great farmers are in every country
the principal improvers. There are more such, perhaps, in England
than in any other European monarchy. In the republican governments of
Holland, and of Berne in Switzerland, the farmers are said to be not
inferior to those of England.

The ancient policy of Europe was, over and above all this, unfavourable
to the improvement and cultivation of land, whether carried on by the
proprietor or by the farmer; first, by the general prohibition of the
exportation of corn, without a special licence, which seems to have been
a very universal regulation; and, secondly, by the restraints which were
laid upon the inland commerce, not only of corn, but of almost every
other part of the produce of the farm, by the absurd laws against
engrossers, regraters, and forestallers, and by the privileges of fairs
and markets. It has already been observed in what manner the prohibition
of the exportation of corn, together with some encouragement given to
the importation of foreign corn, obstructed the cultivation of ancient
Italy, naturally the most fertile country in Europe, and at that time
the seat of the greatest empire in the world. To what degree such
restraints upon the inland commerce of this commodity, joined to
the general prohibition of exportation, must have discouraged
the cultivation of countries less fertile, and less favourably
circumstanced, it is not, perhaps, very easy to imagine.




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