ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
I. EFFECT ON STATUS OF EXISTING PERSONNEL
One of the most troublesome of all the problems that arise in the
initial stages of drafting civil service legislation is the treatment of offi-
cers and employees who are in the service when the change from the
political to the merit service takes place.CThe proponents of the change
are likely to feel that those appointed prior to the inauguration of the
compulsory merit system are not the persons who should be retained
indefinitely in the public service. Those who are already in the service
will argue that years of experience in the service have given them com-
petency, and also that certain humanitarian considerations should pre-
vail in favor of those who have entered the public instead of the private
service and presumably have lost some of the gains thought to inhere in
the latter. ^
Various alternatives and compromises are found in existing ciyU serv-
ice Jaws, rangingTFonTretention ofThe old employees, witfiT or without
Itne tenure protections of the civil service law, to immediate discharge.
The statute or charter provision must lay down the rule to be followed. 1
A civil service law may provide thatfas vacancies occur in the service
those selected to fill the vacancies shall be chosen in accordance with the
civil service provisions and shall be subject to the obligations and pro-
tections provided for in such a law^New positions may likewise be sub-
jected to the recruiting provisions of the civil service law. This method
has (the ..-. ..:!. 1:41 of fitting the new principles of personnel into the
system gradually and without too sudden a change.] The proponents of
the merit principle often feel, however, that it takes too long under such
a plan to convert the system into a merit service.
Under a charter providing that vacancies and newly created positions
were to be filled in accordance with the civil service rules, it has been
held that employees appointed under the civil service and those ap-
pointed under the previous laws are of equal status in case of a reduction
of force made for reasons of economy; that is, it would be possible for
the old employees to be retained and for those chosen under the civil
service procedure to be laid off, subject of course to the usual rules gov-
erning good faith in the economy plea. 2 A statement of the kind made
in this charter did not affect the status or rights of the old employees.
A new appointee who has not complied with the new civil service act
cannot obtain the help of the courts in ousting the prior holder of the
A provision that on and after a certain date appointments are to be
made on the basis of merit leaves untouched all officers then holding
office for definite terms. The phraseology of the statute is such that the
operation of the act is prospective, 4 and has no effect upon those ap-
pointed for definite terms under earlier statutes.
It is important to notice in each case whether the civil service law
affects offices or officers. Some courts tend, in case of doubt, to read
the statute as covering in offices rather than officers. This interpretation
makes it possible to remove those who were appointed under the politi-
cal system in accordance with the rules governing appointments of that
kind; the court seems to feel that only those who have been examined
and certified under the civil service provisions should be entitled to the
special career protections usually provided therein. 5
The courts tend, in interpreting a statute, to restrict it to its express
provisions. A statute reciting that "all the clerical and other subordinate
forces . . not removable without "cause in the public employ in any
part of the city" shall likewise under the newly reorganized city admin-
istration not be removed without cause was held not to protect officers
against political removal but to apply to employees only. 6
/Some statutes provide for the creation of vacancies in all positions in
the classified service as soon as the rules for the administration of the
civil service have been adopted and eligible lists prepared from which the
vacancies can be filled) An example of such a statute follows. "The in-
cumbents (all employees) of all positions at the time this charter takes
effect coming within the competitive class of the classified service, may
continue in service and discharge the duties assigned them until the
beginning of the fiscal year 1910, and until the board secures an eligible
list and promulgates rules as provided . . . whereupon said incumbents
shall be deemed to have vacated their several positions." r Such a statute
applies to the incumbents so as to cut their terms of office or employment
short by operation of law.
2 Kessler v. Seattle, 93 Wash. 192, 160 Pac. 423 (1916).
8 Middlesboro ex rel. Minton v. Gibson, 225 Ky. 120, 7 S. W. (2d) 825 (1929).
* State ex rel. McNamara v. Campbell, 94 Oh. St. 403, 115 N. E. 29 (1916).
6 Shinn v. People, 59 Colo. 509, 149 Pac. 623 (1915); Sowers v. Pitcher, 63 Colo. 139,
165 Pac. 253 (1917).
e People ex rel. Percival v. Cram, 164 N. Y. 166, 58 N. E. 112 (1900).
7 Gregory v. Kansas City, 244 Mo. 523, 149 S. W. 466 (1912). See State ex rel. Nelson
v. Board of Public Welfare, 149 Minn. 322, 183 N. W. 521 (1921).
A Minnesota statute provided thatrNo officer or employee after six
months' continuous employment shall be removed or discharged except
for cause, upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard
in his own defense as in this chapter hereinafter provided/! The court
held that this section permitted the removal without cause of city em-
ployees during the first six months of a newly adopted civil service sys-
tem. Such interpretation would be necessary, said the court, in order to
clean house, as it were, and leave room for appointees recruited under
the merit system. 8
Not only do the courts seem disinclined to interpret a civil service
statute in such a manner as to bring under it those not clearly included
by the terms of the act, 9 but they tend to a narrow interpretation of the
phrase "civil service" itself. A statute that covered in persons "serving
in the state civil service" has been construed to mean persons serving in
the state administration under prior civil service acts, 10 rather than all
that part of governmental administration distinguished from military
Some difference of opinion has arisen over the effect of covering in
officers "now elected," but the Massachusetts rule seems preferable to the
Illinois rule on this point. The .former court holds that the use of the
phrase "now elected" is significant, and has decided that offices created
after the adoption of the act are also to be subjected to the statute. 11 The
attorney general has ruled that the United States civil service act applies
to positions created and classified subsequent to its enactment. 12
An attempt to give old employees some preference under a reorgan-
ized administrative system that included a civil service is to be seen in
a charter which provided that the new board should make appointments
from among the force in the service at the time the new charter went
into effect, and that such members should not be required to pass a civil
service examination, although all future appointments should be made
from lists of persons who had passed such examination. This was held
to leave the board free to fill any newly created offices, that is, not in the
old department, with persons outside the department membership list. la
It does not follow, of course, that giving preference to old employees in
a newly reorganized department necessarily protects them against arbi-
trary removal. Whether such preference does or does not carry with it
8 Saholt v. Rochester, 185 Minn. 510, 242 N. W. 4 (1932).
9 People v. Chicago, 242 111. 561, 90 N. E. 259 (1909).
10 Kennedy v. State Personnel Board, 6 Cal. (2d) 340, 57 P. (2d) 486 (1936). See
Huston v. State Personnel Board, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 707, 57 P. (2d) 976 (1936).
11 Attorney General v. Tillinghast, 203 Mass. 539, 89 N. E. 1058 (1909). See People
ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 171 111. 44, 49 N. E. 229 (1898).
13 17 Ops. Atty. Gen. 621 (1883).
18 Maxwell v. Fire Commissioners, 139 Cal. 229, 72 Pac. 996 (1903).
30 CIVIL SERVICE LAW
this protection depends upon the phraseology of the statute involved.
This is well illustrated by a California case. One section of the charter
provided for preference to "persons employed in operating services of
the Geary Street . . . Railroad Co. on May 5, 1912, such preference to be
solely for employment in the Municipal Railroad service," while another
section provided that persons employed in the operating service of any
public utility acquired by the city who had been so employed for not less
than one year, and who were employed by the public utility at the time
when it was acquired by the city, should be continued in their positions.
These two sections were held to give protection against removal to one
group but not to the other. 14 Preference in employment carries with it
less than a guarantee of continuance in employment. The rule is general
that an act providing protection to persons "appointed or employed as a
result of such examination" gives no protection to those appointed or
employed without such an examination unless the statute expressly ex-
tends it to them. 15
Another example of the difficulties encountered in cities with munici-
pally owned commercial enterprises is to be found in these provisions
of a California charter. Holders of exempt positions under the previous
civil service law "shall be continued in their positions as if appointed
thereto after examinations and certification from a list of eligibles and
shall be governed thereafter by the provisions of this charter." But the
provision concerning the municipal airport stated that "Positions and
employments in the municipal airport . . . shall be continued and the
employees thereof shall, subject to the approval of the commission, be
appointed by and hold office at the pleasure of the manager of utilities."
Those who came under the latter provision were held not to have been
covered in by the charter. 16
Protection against removal without cause was granted by the Des
Moines charter to those who were retained through long and efficient
service; protection against removal without a hearing was extended to
those who were appointed under examinations authorized by the new
civil service provision. 17 Effect was given to the distinction, as it was
thought not inadvertent. A Minnesota statute provided that "All officers
and employees of the department of health shall be eligible to similar
positions under the board of public welfare hereby created without being
required to take a civil service examination as to their qualifications there-
fore, and they shall continue in their respective positions from the time
this act goes into effect, until further action of the board." An employee
was discharged from service and the next day was appointed to a differ-
ent position. A month later he was suspended and given a hearing by the
board. Subsequent to his discharge, he claimed that he should have been
given a hearing before the civil service commission, such a hearing being
provided for in the removal section of the civil service law. The court
held that he was not entitled to such hearing. 18 Only those who were
appointed from the eligible list that was prepared after examination, not
those appointed from the list of existing employees, were entitled to the
protections of the civil service act. He was a probationer, having served
only one month in the new position. The case was weakened somewhat
by the fact that he had admitted the charges and had waived his right
to a hearing by not claiming it seasonably, but the opinion of the court
is clear on the point that different protections were extended to those
who came in by examination and to those who came in by the covering
There have been cases in which department heads or those influencing
them moved to discharge certain employees before the civil service came
into effect. "Employees within the scope of this article at the time of the
adoption of this article shall retain their positions, unless removed for
cause" has been made the basis -for permitting the use of quo warranto
by the ousted officer to question the title of one who was appointed in
his place after the passage of the civil service law but before the estab-
lishment of the machinery necessary to its operation. 19 The removal pro-
visions of the new statute may become effective even though the ap-
pointive sections do not. One method used in paving the way for a free
administrative hand after the civil service law has become effective is to
take resignations and hold them until such a time as seems suitable. A
resignation is valid, even though obtained with this purpose in mind,
if no duress or fraud enters into the situation. 20 However, if duress is
used and misrepresentations are made, a resignation is invalid. 21
The practice of covering in officers and employees makes it necessary
to fix some time as of which members of the service are to be treated as
members for coverage purposes. It is customary to fix a date for begin-
ning the new service, but there may remain some question as to whether
certain individuals were appointed to the service before or after that
date. The date of the appointment, not the date when the appointee
18 State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of Public Welfare, 149 Minn. 322, 183 N. W. 521
19 State ex rel. Powell v. Fassett, 69 Wash. 555, 125 Pac. 963 (1912).
20 Byrne v. St. Paul, 137 Minn. 235, 163 N. W. 162 (1917).
a Kidd v. State Civil Service Commission, 57 P. (2d) 569 (Cal. App. 1936). On re-
moval through resignation from the classified service, see Williams v. State, 127 Oh. St.
398, 1 88 N. E. 654 (1933); People ex rel. Doran v. Gallaher, 82 Misc. 679, 144 N. Y. S.
32 CIVIL SERVICE LAW
starts work, decides the issue. 22 So, also, the date of appointment rather
than the date of taking the oath is determinative, unless the oath is a
condition precedent to the taking of office. 28
In one instance, an employee was told on April first, the date on which
the civil service act went into effect, that he had been fired the day before.
The court held that removal could not have a retroactive effect, and that
on and after the date that the law went into effect, the removal pro-
cedures outlined in the new law must be followed. 24
Civil service laws sometimes impose the requirement of residence.
Interpretation depends on the phraseology used, but a statement that no
person "not a citizen" and resident in the state shall be eligible to ap-
pointment or employment has been used to bar nonresidents from serv-
ice even though they held positions in the prior service. 25
A requirement that an examination must be passed by persons in the
service less than five years prior to the adoption of the civil service law
is valid, although members of the service for more than five years are
excused from the requirement. 26 The five-year term of service is a rea-
sonable one and looked on as assurance of competency and familiarity
with the work. Statutes vary considerably in the periods used to measure
these factors, however.
The requirement that those now in the service must take examina-
tions does not always guarantee them places, even though they pass the
examinations. A provision that present employees should be kept on and
assigned to work is interpreted to mean that if there is work they can
get it, but mandamus will not issue to compel the fixing of a salary for
work that has not been entered upon, because until the person has ac-
tually been assigned to a position, it is not possible for him to show a
clear right to any particular salary. 27
For one reason or another it sometimes happens that the qualifying
examination for retention in the service is not given within the time
specified by law. What happens to the tenure of those who should have
been given the examination? As one example, an Ohio statute provided
that "The incumbents of all offices and places in the competitive classified
service . . . shall, whenever the commission shall require, and within
twelve months after the rules adopted by the commission go into effect,
be subject to non-competitive examinations as a condition of continuing
82 21 Ops. Atty. Gen. 140 (1895).
28 19 Ops. Atty. Gen. 410 (1889).
24 Stevens v. Crosbie, 137 Md. 655, 113 Atl. 329 (1921).
^Hellyer v. Pendergast, 176 A. D. 383, 162 N. Y. S. 788 (1917).
28 Stolzy v. City of Henderson, 8 S. W. (2d) 629 (Ky. 1928). See Roark v. State ex. rel.
Waters, 107 Fla. 659, 145 So. 867 (1933).
'"People ex rel. Sullivan v. New York, 128 N. Y. S. 776 (1910).
in the service . . ." The examination was not given within this specified
period. The court said that it was a reasonable construction of the statute
to hold that if the commission should delay the noncompetitive examina-
tion for a reasonable time beyond that prescribed, the employees affected
would hold over. It was made clear, however, that if the examination
was delayed an unreasonable length of time, the court could compel the
commission to offer it to the affected persons. 28
The courts are sometimes influenced by factors of fairness and reliance
upon administrative inaction in cases in which employees have been de-
clared to be subject to examination before receiving full civil service
status but have been given no such examination. The mere fact of taking
an examination is not sufficient. It is necessary to pass it. It is likewise
necessary to assert the rights that are supposed to accrue from the passing
of the examination within a reasonable time. 29 A person who is covered
in and given protection against removal does not lose his rights upon
illegal removal from the service, and after such a removal cannot be
forced to take an examination to recover the position from which he was
\v ronofulK ejected. 80 A person who is wrongfully in the service, but who
would otherwise seem to be within the provisions covering in existing
employees, is not given the benefits of coverage. A statutory recitation
that all persons holding positions within the classified service, as that
service is defined in the act, shall be retained in the service does not save
a person who is wrongfully in office. 31 The court properly thought that
in a civilized community the phrase "holding a position or office" meant
lawfully holding a position or office.
The tenure provisions of a civil service act do not protect a de facto
officer. "To construe the civil service act so as to keep in office one hold-
ing such office without right, would subvert the beneficent purpose of
that legislation. It is manifest that its applications must be limited to the
protection of officers de jure." 32 Neither does a person holding an exempt
position under an existing civil service act get any protection during the
probationary period provided under a new act. 38 The statute provided
that "such probationary period [was] to commence on the effective date
hereof of not less than two months nor more than eight months." This
was held not to mean that the commission must fix the probationary
period before the two months expired. It had been argued that if this
28 State ex rel. Mugavin v. Keefer, 3 Oh. App. 440 (1914). State ex rel. Bartholomew v.
Witt, 3 Oh. App. 414 (1914).
^Kenneally v. Chicago, 220 111. 485, 77 N. E. 155 (1906). See Johnson v. Pugh, 152
Minn. 437, 189 N. W. 257 (1922).
80 People v. Stevenson, 270 111. 569, no N. E. 814 (1915).
81 People v. Chew, 68 Colo. 158, 187 Pac. 513 (1920).
82 Salter v. Burk, 83 N. J. L. 152, 83 Atl. 973 (1912).
88 Kennedy v. State Personnel Board, supra, note 10.
34 CIVIL SERVICE LAW
were not done, all employees would be protected after that time. This
contention was rejected by the court.
A holdover is not protected by the provisions that are usually made
for covering in present employees or officers. The reason for a successor's
provision ("and until a successor is appointed and qualified") is not to
extend the term of office, but to ensure the performance of the duties of
the position. Under this view of the purpose of a holdover provision, a
vacancy exists that can be filled when the new civil service act becomes
effective. 34 The courts are badly confused and divided on the subject of
holdovers in general. 35
The status of temporary appointments under civil service acts will be
discussed in detail elsewhere (Chapter VI). Temporary appointments
are authorized under certain conditions and for relatively short periods
by many of the merit statutes. But are temporary appointees who are in
the service when a civil service act is adopted affected by the usual cover-
age provisions ? The courts look with disfavor upon any interpretation
that tends to include temporary appointees in the group covered in under
the new act. A statute reciting that all officers "holding office or employ-
ment at the time of the introduction of this act, or who may hereafter be
appointed, shall continue to hold their offices or employments as the case
may be, and shall not be removed therefrom except in accordance with
the provisions [of this actj" was held not to apply to temporary appoint-
ees who were in office either at the time the act was introduced or when
it took effect. 36
Apparently the courts are not always particular whether the examina-
tion required is noncompetitive or competitive, so long as it is at least
as severe as that specified by the statute. In Ohio it was held that a person
who took a competitive examination and passed it, though ranking
nineteenth on the list, had complied with the statutory requirement that
present incumbents pass a noncompetitive examination as a condition
of retaining office. This rule was extended to a temporary appointee who
was holding office at the time the law was adopted. 37
A civil service rule that permitted temporary appointments not to
exceed one month provided that temporary appointees should not be
covered in under the new law. A person who claimed that he had orig-
inally held a position that was covered in accepted a temporary appoint-
ment to another position for one month and until an examination was
84 For removal and its relation to this problem, see Chapter IX. See also People v. Chi-
cago, 104 111. App. 250 (1902), affirmed, 210 111. 479, 71 N. E. 400.
85 See Dawley, The Governors' Constitutional Power of Appointment and Removal, 22
Minn. L. Rev. 451 (1938).
88 Shalvoy v. Johnson, 84 N. J. L. 134, 86 Atl. 81 (1913).
S7 Hornberger v. State ex rel. Fisher, 95 Oh. St. 148, 116 N. E. 28 (1917).
to be held; he then asked that his rights be adjudged on the basis of his
original position. The court held that by accepting a temporary appoint-
ment he was estopped to assail the rule. He was also estopped to deny
that his appointment was temporary. 38 A rule of the United States Civil
Service Commission that "all persons serving under temporary appoint-
ments at the date of the approval of this section may be permanently
appointed, in the discretion of the proper appointing officer" was inter-
preted as applying only to those positions for which there were no eli-
gibles on the list. Temporary appointees in the sense of persons appointed
to work temporarily could not be given permanent status. 89
In general it may be said that the status of persons in the old service
at the time the civil service act takes effect is controlled largely by the
provisions of the act itself. They may be treated as outsiders or they may
be given various degrees of protection under the new act, depending in
most cases on the exact phraseology of the act itself. 40
The salary claims that have arisen out of removals preceding the
adoption of a civil service law may be cut off by the new statute, and
apparently such a provision is valid. 41
II. EFFECT ON TERMS
The manner in which tenure of office is affected by the introduction
of civil service laws has not received much attention in the descriptive
books on the merit system. Rules governing tenure of office are the
product partly of statutory provisions, partly of constitutional provisions,
and partly of common law principles. To discover the rules governing
tenure in any particular case, it is necessary to consult not only the civil
service laws and regulations but the statutes and decisions on tenure in
An example of a constitutional provision affecting tenure is found in
Section 20 of Article II of the constitution of Ohio: "The General As-
sembly, in cases not provided for in this Constitution, shall fix the term
of office and the compensation of all officers: but no change therein shall
affect the salary of any officer during his existing term, unless the office
be abolished." The Ohio court held that this provision applied to both
elective and appointive officers, and that if an office falling within the
scope of a subsequent civil service law had a definite term attached to it,
88 Matter of Hayes, 56 A. D. 20, 67 N. Y. S. 340 (1900), affirmed, 166 N. Y. 603, 59
N. E. 1132.
88 22 Ops. Atty. Gen. 556 (1899).
40 People v. Chew, 67 Colo. 394, 179 Pac. 812 (1919).
41 State ex rel. Otto v. Kansas City, 310 Mo. 542, 276 S. W. 389 (1925). Presumably
this could not be done if the claims had been reduced to judgment.
43 See Tenure of Office under New Jersey Civil Service, 32 N. J. L. Jour. 163 (1909).
36 CIVIL SERVICE LAW
the incumbent could not be subjected to the control of a civil service
commission until the office either became vacant or was abolished. 43
When his term had expired, however, the provisions of the civil service
law would be followed in filling the vacancy. This case illustrates the
possibility that a civil service act, though perfectly valid in general,
cannot immediately upon its enactment and application be applied to
all those to whom it can eventually apply. The constitutional definition
of offices may not refer to statutory or local offices, and for that reason
the offices to which the civil service applies may not be affected by the
constitutional rule. 44
A constitutional provision that limits the terms of all offices in a state
to four years does not apply to employees because of the distinction at
common law between officers and employees. 45 If a provision relates to
officers, it relates to officers alone; if all governmental workers are to be
included, draftsmen must be careful to make that clear. The problem
of determining whether a person is an officer or an employee is solved by
reference to the common law tests of an officer. Constitutional mention
of "officer" is interpreted as a use of the term in its common law mean-
ing unless the contrary is clear.
It is clear that a civil service law cannot extend terms of office to run
indefinitely when under the constitution they run at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. 46 Section 2 of Article XV of the Kansas constitu-
tion provided that "The tenure of any office not herein provided for may
be declared by law; when not so declared such office shall be held during
the pleasure of the authority making the appointment ..." A civil service
law may not extend the tenure here provided for and substitute indefinite
tenure during good behavior. Section 3 of Article X of the New York
constitution is very similar to that quoted above: "When the duration
of any office is not provided for in this constitution, it may be declared
by law, and if not so declared, such office shall be held during the pleas-
ure of the authority making the appointment." The existence of provi-
sions in a civil service law protecting officers within the service against
arbitrary removal was held not to fix a term for them, with the result
that removal could be at the pleasure of the appointing officer. 47 Such
a decision seems to confuse a statute fixing tenure with one governing
removal procedure. For example, a provision that the term of office shall
48 State ex rel. McNamara v. Campbell, supra, note 4.
"People ex rel. Akin v. Loeffler, 175 111. 585, 51 N. E. 785 (1898).
45 Jagger v. Green, 90 Kan. 153, 133 Pac. 174 (1913). See People ex rel. Akin v. Loeffler,
supra, note 44.
^Haney v. Cofran, 94 Kan. 332, 146 Pac. 1027 (1915), modified, 95 Kan. 335, 148
47 People ex rel. Ray v, Henry, 47 A. D. 133, 62 N. Y. S. 102 (1900).
be two years does not mean that the appointee may, under any and all
circumstances, hold that position for two years. He may be removable
for enumerated causes. Nor does the fact that he may be removed within
one year for cause mean that the tenure is for less than two years. To
construe the removal protections of a civil service law as fixing tenure is
to confuse the procedure for exercising the power to terminate tenure
with the statutory declaration of the maximum term of that tenure if no
occasion arises for bringing this procedure into play. A later New York
case seems to proceed upon the theory set forth in this paragraph. 48
A statute may combine provisions for tenure and provisions for ter-
minating that tenure, with the result that the tenure is for an indefinite
period. A statute providing that certain officers "shall continue in office
unless suspended or dismissed" creates an indefinite term. 40 Some courts,
for example, that in Massachusetts, are more loath than others to see in
a civil service law a change in the law of terms of office unless the civil
service law is clearly intended to affect terms. A Massachusetts statute
recited that persons in the classified service "shall hold such office . . .
and shall not be removed therefrom . . . except for just cause"; the court
held that this did not extend the term of office of one holding under a
prior statute fixing a definite term. "Any other construction would en-
large an appointment for a term of years into a life tenure, provided it
was a classified office under the civil service rules." 50 The court was af-
fected by the fact that offices rather than officers were classified under the
civil service law.
As is noted elsewhere in this chapter, a civil service law may have the
effect of protecting an officer against removal during the term for which
he holds office, even though the term is definite. After the term expires
he receives no protection from the civil service act. But while his term
is running, he can be removed only in accordance with the provisions of
the civil service act. "It long has been established that the statute which
regulates removals from office in the classified civil service protects the
holder of the office only during the term for which he has been ap-
A civil service statute or a civil service provision of a state constitution
may, of course, provide explicitly for definite or indefinite terms; and
when that is clearly done, the courts apply the law so declared. The Colo-
rado constitution provides that "Appointments and employments . . .
in the classified civil service of the state shall be made according to merit
and fitness . . ." "The classified civil service of the state shall comprise
all appointive public officers and employees and the places which they
hold, except the following; . . ." "Persons in the classified service shall
hold their respective positions during efficient service . . ." This provi-
sion creates a system of tenure during "efficient service," and the court so
held. 52 Statutes may likewise create tenure for "good behavior" or "good
behavior and efficient service," and the courts seem to favor giving civil
service laws such effect when there is no special obstacle thereto.