BRITISH WAR FINANCE. Article in Economic Journal, Dec.
The financial position on the outbreak of war : relatively
weak reserve, shortage of internal currency, inconverti-
bility of international currency, bankers' " liquid " assets
frozen, 1-8. The emergency relief measures, excessive,
8-13. Services of the Bank of England, 14. The Stock
Exchange, 14-17. The Currency Notes : as emergency
currency, and as a means of concentrating gold, 17-24.
Our financial methods : remarkable success of the Treasury
Bill, the system of continuous borrowing, 24-27. Real
problem behind the machinery of finance, the balance of
production and consumption, not adequately adjusted,
27, 28. Hence exchange difficulties, met in various ways,
28-30. The only final remedy must be found in maximum
efficiency, minimum consumption, 30-33.
WAYS AND MEANS. Article in Economic Journal, Mar. 1916 - 34-68
The financial outlook in February 1916, 34-37. The
pre-war system of raising loans has undergone a remark-
able transformation, 37-39. Continuous Borrowing : its
success in Great Britain and France, certain adjustments
required, preferable to financing by big loans, 39-51.
Loans must be raised abroad to correct the exchanges,
51-55. Vital importance of the Stock Exchange, now
paralysed by restrictions, 55-57. War borrowing should
be popularised, as in France, 67-59. Thrift, long dis-
couraged in this country, requires to be stimulated, 59-62.
Premium Bonds, 62, 63. Public waste, 64. Taxation as a
means of enforcing Economy, 64-68.
THE NATUKE OP THE INDUSTRIAL STRUGGLE. A Lecture at
the Royal Institution, Apr. 19, 1917. Reprinted from the
Economic Journal, Sept. 1917 69-96
Various conceptions of business competition : is it War,
or Mutual Service, 69-73. Forms of business practice
infinitely varied, as to aims, methods, rules and standards
of honour, may be roughly grouped under three heads, 73.
Competition for efficiency, 73-75. Unfair and fraudulent
competition, 75-79. Predatory competition, aiming at the
capture of the market, 79-84. The State obliged to regu-
late the competitive contest, and sometimes takes a hand
in it, 84, 85. Organisation and scientific control the order
of the day, 85-88. A certain prejudice against both in
this country, but the presumptions in their favour irre-
sistible, 88-91. Trade war as waged by Germany, 91-94.
Need not be imitated here, but the predatory element in
business will remain, and what is urgent is to raise the
standards of conflict, whether military or commercial, 94-96.
THE FINANCING or INDUSTRY AND TRADE. A Lecture at the
Royal Institution, Apr. 26, 1917. Reprinted from the
Economic Journal, Dec. 1917 97-134
The industrial bank a French creation, developed in Ger-
many, 97-98. Attention called to the question in England,
98-100. Is industrial finance too " adventurous " for our
banks ? 100-104. English banking is quite peculiar in its
type, 104-106. It is first-rate of its kind, and has carried
remittance and clearing to perfection, but these services
involve enormous call liabilities, 106-109. Hence a ten-
dency to financial rather than industrial banking, because
assets more "liquid," 109-112. Assistance to industry
mainly limited to short finance, 112, 113. German banking,
in structure and scale much like our own, is very different
in its financial policy, 113-118. Its intimate connection
with German industry, 118-121. Encroaches unduly on
the Stock Exchange, 121, 122. Is elaborately organised
for promoting over-seas trade, and for " peaceful penetra-
tion," 122-125. Our resources for work of this kind quite
unrivalled, but not adequately organised, 125-128. We
need Issue Houses which will devote themselves to domestic
industry rather than to international issues, 128-132.
Recent developments : the British Trade Corporation, 132-
THE BANKING RESERVE. A Lecture to the Chartered Institute
of Secretaries, Feb. 24, 1909. Reprinted from The Secre-
tary for Mar. 1909 135-170
The question urgent, and of national concern, 135-138.
Banking Reserve defined : does not strictly include money
at call, nor till-money, nor even all " cash," 138-144. Nor
is locked -up money reserve, hence the failure of the old
reserve law of the United States, 144, 145. The reserve
position in Great Britain, 145-148. Some specially danger-
ous forms of liability, 148-152. The position in case of a
first-class war, 152, 153. Reasons for deeming our reserve
insufficient, 153-156. Alternative expedients : pull of the
discount rate, purchase of gold at a premium, sale of securities,
etc., collective guarantee, emergency note issues ; all open
to objection or inadequate, 156-160. Some suggested
reforms : fuller publicity and better returns, 160-162. The
whole responsibility can hardly be thrown on the Bank of
England, though there must be unity in the discount
policy, 162-164. There might be a second reserve con-
tributed by the Clearing Banks, and an ultimate reserve
contributed by the State, these new reserves to be succes-
sively available as the pressure in the .market increased,
THB AMERICAN CRISIS OP 1907. A Lecture to the Chartered
Institute of Secretaries , Mar. 31, 1909. Reprinted from
The Secretary, April and May, 1909 171-219
Essentially a banking crisis, it illustrates the question of
reserve, 171-173. Neither the industrial nor the financial
conditions were specially unsound in Oct. 1907, 173-178.
The fault lay in the banking system, 178-180. The United
States system described, and contrasted with our own,
180-186. The Reserve Law, how it worked, 186-192.
History of the crisis : speculation engineered by bank and
trust control, 192-196. Run on the banks, intensified by
expectation of the usual premium on currency, 196-198.
Banks suspend payment and hoard, 198-202. Legal
holidays, 202. Irregular currency issues, 203, 204.
Government relief measures, and shipments of gold from
London, 204-206. Some effects of the crisis, 206-208.
Remedial legislation: the A Urich : Vreeland Bill, 208-211.
Elastic banking, not elastic currency, what was needed,
211-213. This implied central control, such as was exercised
by the great national banks in Europe, though there were
difficulties in establishing such control in the United States,
INFLATION : IN WHAT SENSE rr EXISTS ; How PAR IT CAN BE
CONTROLLED. An Address to the Institute of Actuaries,
Mar. 26, 1917. With an account of the Discussion and a
Reply to some of the Criticisms. Reprinted from the
Journal of the Institute, No. 268, Oct. 1917 - - 220-262
General concern on the subject of inflation, 220-222.
Different meanings attached to the term : First, loss of
parity with standard coin, 222-224. Secondly, loss of
parity with a foreign currency, 224, 225. The present
state of the exchanges, 225-229. Thirdly, the rise of prices,
229. This rise is international, and means that gold itself is
depreciated, 229-232. It is due to the enormous increase
in the purchasing power of Governments, 232-236, shown
here in the rise in bank deposits, 236-238, and also to a
certain shortage in productive power, 238-240. Borrowing
by big loans creates more inflation than continuous borrow-
ing, as Mr. Drummond Fraser's charts show, 240-245.
The depreciation is not so much in our currency, as in gold
itself, 245, 246. Abstract of the discussion at the Institute
of Actuaries, 246-262.
THE GROWTH OP MONOPOLY, AND ITS BEARING ON THE FUNC-
TIONS OF THE STATE. A Paper read at the Bath Meeting
of the British Association, Sept. 7, 1888 - - - 263-277
Contrary to the expectation of Adam Smith and his con-
temporaries, we find competition tending to result in
monopoly, 263, 264. Competition is a selective and tran-
sitional, not a settled or permanent state, 264. Modern
developments of transport, etc., all favourable to the
growth of monopolies, 265. But this growth has certain
limitations, 265, 266. Monopoly defined, 266. Monopolies
classified, 267. Combination not so enduring a basis of
monopoly as fusion, 267. Monopolies of local service
inevitable, 267, 268. The reasonable attitude towards the
new monopolies, 269, 270. Their advantages, to the public,
to those employed, 270, 271. Certain dangers, 271, 272.
State administration open to more objection, 273, 274.
But public control and enforced publicity are essential,
274, 275. If excessive profits are made, they can be taxed,
or shared with the consumer or with the employed, 275,
276. The alternative to State Control is State Socialism,
FIXED EXCHANGE WITHIN THE EMPIRE. A Letter to the Bankers'